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Stones against the Iron Fist, Terror within the 
Nation: Alternating Structures of Violence and 
Cultural Identity in the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict 
 
SCOTT ATRAN 
 
INTRODUCTION: STRUCTURES OF VIOLENCE 
 
The framework of the Israel-Palestinian Arab conflict has evolved over the last 
half century through an instrumentalization of violence by the parties concerned. Two 
alternating "structures of violence" have emerged to define this instrumentality: the one 
Israeli, the other Palestinian. 
I call these structures of violence "alternating" rather than merely "reciprocating" 
because the one not only feeds off the other and actually practices on the other that which 
is merely fancied and projected as the other's intention but also because they have inverse 
periodicities: The "Great Revolt" (al-Thawra alKubra) of 1936-1939 introduced the 
principle of "armed struggle" (al-kifah al-musalah) into the practice and lore of a 
fractured and often factional antiBritish and anti-Zionist insurgency. It was effectively 
countered by British might coupled with an essentially defensive Jewish posture of 
consensus and "restraint" (havgalah). By contrast the current Palestinian "Uprising" 
(Intifada) has the Arab side preaching restraint if not always nonviolence (al-la `unf), 
through a pluralistic consensus on the immediate national ends such practice aims to 
achieve. Against this is an avowed Israeli policy of "the iron fist" (ha-yad hazaqah, 
barzel Yisrael) that for the first time since independence has broken the general Zionist 
consensus with regard not only to the utility and morality of violent means but also to 
national goals. 
Both structures have a threefold character: (1) a material goal, the path to which, 
if it is perceived to be blocked, is judged a proximate cause for violence; (2) institutional 
modes of violence that delimit the scope and limits of its application, and (3) a moral 
imperative that defines the ethics of violence for whom and to whom it may be applied 
and under which circumstances it may be necessary or counterproductive. The joint 
articulation of these three components can be deemed an "ideology of violence." It is with 
the elaboration of such ideology, including its irrational and mystical underpinnings, that 
this article is concerned. My hypothesis is that for different reasons both sides initially 
lacked such ideologies-and therefore also lacked structures of violence-then proceeded to 
elaborate them in tandem. The dominant ideologies, however, were not elaborated as-
mirror images of one another but in a somewhat refractory and inverted way. 
There is, it appears, a "tension" that develops and structures these alternating 
ideologies of violence. Driven by the essentialist logic of an inherently unstable nation-
state identity, it compels victim and victimizer to internalize and invert the other's 
ideology. The increasingly marginalized victims institutionalize their violence as one 
means of centralizing their cultural claim to a homeland while victimizers morally co-opt 
the victim's image. There are degrees and phases in this alternation. Peace could be one 
of them. 
 
THE MATERIAL GOAL OF VIOLENCE 
 
In its concrete expression, the material goal is much the same for both sides: a 
sovereign national territory in (and ideally over) historic Palestine. Much more than the 
quest for markets or labor, the struggle for an exclusive territory is the material factor that 
fuels both national movements. Acquisition of land is considered the primary mode of 
national "redemption." Thus it is hardly surprising that "land" is the central metaphor in 
the Zionist-Palestinian struggle. The first Zionist colonizers referred to Palestine simply 
as "The Land" (Ha-aretz), and this is the familiar way Israelis call their country. For 
Palestinians historically, "land and honor" (al-ard wal-`ard) were inseparable values and 
worthy of life and death struggle (even religion generally did not carry such practical 
commitment). The first organized party of political resistance for Palestinians within 
Israel was the soon-outlawed "Land Party." Presently, "Land Day," which initially 
marked the death of Israeli Arabs protesting over continued Government seizure of their 
lands in March 1976, is considered by Palestinians both within Israel and in the Occupied 
Territories as the premier annual event that unites them in resistance to Zionist expansion. 
Even Israelis are compelled to recognize Land Day as the Arabs' unofficial "national 
day."1 
Mutual perception of these virtually exclusive territorial claims emerged 
gradually between the period of initial colonization and World War I.2 From the outset of 
the British occupation, Jewish leaders refused to acknowledge that the majority 
population of Arab peasants had any claim or tie to the land. According to Zionist leader 
Aaron Aaronson: 
 
The fundamental point to be remembered was that the fear of expropriation did not come from 
the fellahin, who possessed very little land, but from the Effendi class, who obtained the land by doubtful 
means .... It was evident that .... the fellah had no land.3 
 
As for the effendis, their land should be bought or seized. But rather than giving 
some of it over to the fellahin, Britain should award it to Jewish settlers who know how 
to build up the largely "desert and derelict" country. 
By the war's close, Zionist planners were calling for the transfer of "the fellah 
tenants of the effendis" out of Palestine.5 Representatives of the Muslim and Christian 
Arab communities in Palestine warned the American King-Crane Commission, which 
was sent by Wilson in the name of the Paris peace conference, that if the Jews come they 
will try to push "us back to the Hedjaz [Arabian desert]" and "this country will become a 
river of blood." Zionist commentators interpreted the Arabs to mean: "[W]e will push the 
Zionists into the sea-or they will send us back into the desert."6 The Zionist leadership 
opposed any democratic powersharing arrangement with the Arabs on the grounds that: 
"With very few exceptions the Fellahin are illiterate and would be entirely under the 
influence of the few literate Effendis and their agents.”7 In the end, Chaim Weizmann, 
head of the Zionist Organization, persuaded British Prime Minister David Lloyd George 
to instruct Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill: "You mustn't give representative 
government to Palestine.”8 
Nevertheless, the anti-Jewish riots of May 1921 compelled the British high 
commissioner for Palestine, Herbert Samuel, a confessedly "moderate" Zionist, to insist 
that Churchill allow Arabs representation in a "legislative assembly" that would act in an 
advisory capacity to the Civil Administration. A census of the country was instituted in 
1922 for the purpose of preparing a list of electors. Despite the apparent willingness of 
some members of the Arab Executive to participate in the election scheme, however, the 
Palestinians ultimately rejected any power-sharing arrangement that would deny them 
majority control-to the great relief of the Zionist Executive.9 
Regardless of Zionist and British assurances that Jewish political and territorial 
claims were not exclusive, high-ranking Jewish leaders consistently told their colleagues 
on the Palestine Zionist Executive (and later Jewish Agency Executive) that "there is not 
enough room in the country for both peoples."10 According to the Zionist Labor 
Organization, widespread Arab rioting in 1929 against the Jewish settlement (Yishuv) 
resulted not, as a British Government Commission owned,11 from threat of dislocation 
and dispossession. Rather Arab violence was instigated by "the intrigue of the clique of 
effendis," which incited "the fanatical instincts of the ignorant Arab masses."Any Arab 
claim to self-determination was worthless since it came either from blood-sucking 
effendis or peasants and proletarians who have "no representation in the true sense of the 
term....The Arab populace thus remains inarticulate, and their life interests practically 
unvoiced."12 If Arab sentiment were properly voiced, it would undoubtedly reflect what 
"every resident [of Palestine] is forced to recognize," namely, wealth, progress, peace and 
"the development of common ties among all sections of the population."13 
But again the British floated the idea of a Legislative Assembly, arousing fear in 
the Zionist leadership that the Arabs would thereby effectively obtain a veto over any 
expansion of the Jewish settlement.14 And again, despite some guarded Palestinian 
approval of the idea, the Arab Executive ultimately rejected any elective participation in a 
government that failed to overturn Britain's mandatory commitment to a "Jewish National 
Home in Palestine."15 In contrast to Palestinian Arab insistence on an immediate and 
definitive institutionalization of "majority democratic rule," the Zionists did not publicize 
their intention to establish a Jewish state in Palestine (aside from Jabotinsky's 
increasingly marginalized Revisionists). Instead, they focused on the incremental 
achievement of a social, political, military, and territorial infrastructure that was well on 
the way to securing them "economic-strategic" control of the country by the outbreak of 
the Arab revolt in 1936.16 
By 1938 with the Arab Revolt in full swing, Ben Gurion and the majority of the 
executive were calling for the removal of "Arab tenants, laborers and farmers from the 
Jewish State to neighboring Arab states" in accordance with the British Royal 
Commission's suggestions for a population transfer. Nor did Ben Gurion exclude the 
possibility that the transfer would have to be carried out by an "iron fist" (yad hazagah).17 
Nevertheless although Ben Gurion and other Jewish Labor leaders imagined the eventual 
likelihood of Zionist sovereignty over all of historic Palestine with the aid of "an elite 
army ... one of the best in the world,"18 during and after the Arab revolt they did accept 
the notion of a provisional territorial compromise. By contrast, Jabotinsky's Jewish 
nationalist Revisionist Party rejected anything less than full sovereignty over the biblical 
land of Israel. At the very least, this implied "an iron wall" (ha-qir ha-barzel),19 that 
would exclude Arab nationalist aspirations from Palestine and Transjordan. 
For the most part, mainstream Israeli leaders, whether of the left or right, have 
consistently argued that Palestinian Arabs are incapable of representing themselves much 
less worthy of a territory of their own. Indeed, as late as 1969, Labor leader Golda Meir 
denied "there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian 
people... .They did not exist."20 While current Labor leaders Shimon Peres and Yitzhak 
Rabin still do not grant Palestinians the right to choose the PLO as their representative, 
they do allow today that some expression of "Palestinian national rights" may be 
legitimate. Many leaders of the right, however, still take the view of Yossi Ben Aharon, 
Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office: 
 
We should treat this population according to the customs and standards of an Arab society. We 
speak of Palestinian "opinions" but it should be remembered that there is no Arab government which is a 
government of the people, for the people ... what is a Lebanese, a Coptic Egyptian, and Iraqi Kurd? These 
are not nation-states in the classical sense of the word. This wall-to-wall Palestinian coalition which seeks 
self-determination should not be taken to seriously .... If you look at the whole complex, you must reach the 
conclusion that the PLO is not a liberation movement. They have succeeded in this big deception, and 
many Israelis have fallen for it, that there is such a thing as Palestinians... .But from the point of human 
rights ... you agree to some sort of modus vivendi.... They will accept this .... I believe this is realistic.... 
With an Arab society it can be done. We give life, they know how to give death.21 
 
Except for the Palestine Communist Party, the idea of a Palestinian state in Gaza 
and the West Bank alongside Israel did not appear on the Palestinian nationalist agenda 
until shortly before the October 1973 war.22 But this would merely represent a "stage" on 
the way to total liberation of historic Palestine. It was not until nearly a year after the 
outbreak of the Intifada that the PLO accepted the principle of an internationally secured 
territorial compromise. Now, however, Yasser Arafat, chairman of the PLO Executive, 
has declared caduque (null and void) 23 those aspects of the Palestinian National Charter 
that consider: "Palestine, within the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, an 
undivided territorial unit" (art. 2) and "an indivisible part of the Arab Homeland" (art. 1) 
to the exclusion of Jews born after "the Zionist invasion" (art. 6). 4 In counterpoint, Israeli 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, head of the nationalist Likud coalition, replies that talk 
of trading territories for peace is treife (nonkosher) and that "an `iron fist' would meet any 
bid for a Palestinian State."25 In this, Shamir follows the policy of his predecessor, 
Menahem Begin. For it was Begin who, as Jabotinsky's heir, inaugurated Likud's triumph 
over Labor and its ascension to power in 1977 with a policy of "Israel's iron" (barzel 
Yisrael) that aimed to right the historic wrong of the 1948 United Nations partition of 
Palestine: "The partition of the Homeland is illepl.... Eretz Israel will be restored to the 
people of Israel. All of it and forever."26 
Today all public opinion polls indicate that the idea of "Greater Israel" is accepted 
by the majority of Israel's population, although perhaps half the country is still open to 
the idea of negotiating "peace for territory." Increasingly, however, with the rising 
popularity of the Israeli radical right, the public approves of the idea that the Palestinians 
have no place in their country. Although as yet only a small minority is willing to support 
the program of Rabbi Meir Kahane's Kach (Thus) Party, which calls for the expulsion of 
practically all gentiles (goyim) from the holy land, three relatively new parliamentary 
parties, which form part of the governing coalition, openly advocate removal of the Arabs 
from Greater Israel: Tehiya (Renaissance), which calls for "repatriation" of Palestinians 
to other parts of the Arab world, Tsomet (Crossroads), which advocates a "population ex-
change" of Palestinian Arabs for the remaining Jews in Arab countries, and Moledet 
(Homeland) whose campaign symbol is "T" for an offer of "transfer" that the Palestinians 
will surely "agree upon" someday. In addition, some kind of "demographic solution" is an 
avowed aim of the ultranationalist wings of the Nationalist Religious Party (NRP), Shas 
(ultraorthodox party of Sephardic Jews) and Likud 27 To the degree that these parties 
appear to be intent on implementing their "solution" to the Israel-Palestine conflict, 
Palestinians argue, the current Uprising cannot be wholly nonviolent after all, goes the 
comparison, the British Raj never intended to evict Gandhi and his people from India. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL MODES OF VIOLENCE 
 
While intermittently violent conflict over territorial claims characterized Jewish-
Arab relations in the period between the Arab revolt and the end of World War II, the two 
communities still had not developed ideologies of violence. Only with the advent of the 
"memory of the Holocaust" did Zionists assert a moral imperative to employ violent 
means for the wholesale departure of the Arab population from part of Palestine and for 
the necessity of denying Palestinians a sovereign national territory of their own. Although 
before that time Zionists largely adhered to ethnocentric notions of Arab "backwardness" 
and "bloodthirstiness," they were generally uninterested in adopting the "civilizing 
mission" of the imperial powers or the socialist international. This was because of the 
Jews' own involvement in a struggle for national liberation and because they fundamen-
tally did not seek the labor, markets, or salvation of the Palestinian Arabs. 
By contrast, the Arabs were armed with a moral imperative that seized on popular 
stories of the Assassins and wars against the crusaders by invoking the tradition of the 
fida`iyin and the notion of struggle that involved sacrifice 28 A prominent form of 
"radical traditionalism" involved the followers of Shaykh 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam and his 
nationalistic brand of Islamic revivalism (salaftya). It was they who initiated the principle 
of sustained "armed struggle" that Al-Fath was to consciously resurrect 30 years later,29 
and that, after the outbreak of the Intifada, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) 
enshrined in its covenant (of 18 August 1988). Unlike the secular Fath, however, the 
Qassamites saw themselves as fighters (mujahidin) in a holy war (jihad). Tinged with 
religious fervor, the moral imperative for violent struggle also invoked a confused 
mixture of anti-imperialism and antisemitism. Jewish lust for money and blood as 
evinced in such works of "historical fact" as The Jewish Peril and Protocols of the Elders 
of Zion required a strategy of offense to defend everything truly dear to human beings. In 
addition, Jewish "Bolshevism" sought to destroy God-fearing family and community life: 
"You bring with you people who are Bolshevik Disciples, you bring with you dangerous 
Thieves, Impostors and all sorts of Filth from Europe, while you profess that you are 
bringing civilization."30 
What the Palestinian Arabs lacked, however, was the means to permanently 
structure their violent opposition to Zionism. They did not have a coherent political 
framework for carrying through a revolutionary program of national liberation even 
remotely comparable to Zionism's largely autonomous and autarchic protostate 
apparatus.31 Commentators of whatever political persuasion surmise about the revolt 
that the insurgents failed to institute a coherent political program because they failed to 
acquire the trappings of a modem revolutionary party and a policy for progressive 
political action.32 
Although the peasants acted in part out of revolutionary motives, theirs was 
primarily a "reactive struggle" akin to that of the sans culottes before the Jacobin state 
took form. It was an intensely defensive struggle, continuous and with a long history of 
popular rebellions that mark the period before the "proactive" movements of a 
consolidated capitalist economy and nation-state: that is, an effort to reclaim traditional 
rights and to uphold standards that they believed were imperiled by the innovations of 
capitalists, speculators, agricultural "improvers," or government functionaries. 33 In the 
end, this popular struggle collapsed because it remained essentially populist, 
nonprogrammatic and limited in its autonomy and power to develop a revolutionary 
program by the lingering hold of the nahiyeh sheikhs and the domination of the 
effendiyat and ayan (that is, a declining landed gentry, an emergent bourgeoisie, and a 
rising class of urban-based religious notables).34 
In the current Palestinian uprising, resurgent echoes of the Qassamite tradition 
are heard from militants of the Gaza-based Jihad al-Islami, a splinter group of the 
Moslem Brotherhood that preaches holy war against the Jews as "a Moslem duty." The 
idea that Israel, Judaism, and Jews challenge Islam also forms part of the covenant of 
Hamas, the military arm of the Brotherhood; but it is Israel and Zionism, rather than 
Jews and Judaism per se, that are damned for "Nazi treatment" of "men and women, 
children and old people": "The Zionist invasion is a vicious one.... It aims at 
undermining society, annihilating Islam, and it is behind the drug trade and alcoholism 
in all its kinds."35 It is to the most disadvantaged elements of Palestinian society that 
such radical Islamic fundamentalism readily appeals: especially to those in Gaza's 
squalid refugee camps who comprise the majority of the strip's population. After decades 
of degrading social, economic, and political privation in one of the most densely 
populated hells on earth. they have little to lose and less to look forward to. They are 
thus willing to offer life and limb, which is all that is left to them. In the marginally less 
desperate West Bank refugee camps, pan-Arabist (PFLP) and MarxistLeninist (DFLP) 
notions of "revolutionary violence" vie for popular support and control with Hamas's 
call to take up "the sword for Islam. "36 But it is the PLO's dominant faction, Fath, with 
broad-based support among the youth and large middle classes both within the Occupied 
Territories (fi1-dakhil) and outside (fil-kharij), that provides a "bottom line" for unity of 
the Palestinian national movement: namely, independence in (at least part of) historic 
Palestine. 
According to political scientist Yezid Sayigh: "It is Fateh's success in rebasing 
itself in the Occupied Territories [following the 1982 Lebanese debacle] that has 
preserved its centrality in the Palestinian national movement as a whole and reinforced its 
hold on PLO decision-making."37 Its focus on international diplomacy appeals to many 
intellectually and economically influential Palestinians resident in the West while its 
changing emphasis from clandestine military action to social and political activity in the 
Territories has made it the preeminent force among local Palestinians. One reason for this 
was the activity of Khalil Wazir (Abu Jihad), Fath's principle coordinator for action in the 
Occupied Territories. Before his expulsion from Amman in May 1986, Wazir was able to 
build a dynamic youth movement (Harakat ash-Shabibah) in the territories that, while 
not eschewing military action, favored sociopolitical mobilization: student and women's 
organizations, medical and agricultural relief committees, trade unions, and so forth. 
Before the Intifada, the Shabibah were able to organize large demonstrations against the 
occupation and to mobilize their cadres to coordinate and eventually dominate the 
spontaneous outpouring of protest following the outbreak of the Intifada in December 
1987. Arguably, Wazir's assassination in Tunis by Israeli commandos in April 1988 not 
only failed to undermine Fath's operational capability but also critically reinforced the 
Shabibah's stature and role in the uprising. 
True, Fath and the Shabibah initially neither controlled nor guided the weekly 
actions or immediate goals initiated by the local leadership of the Unified Command of 
the Intifada. But with repeated success by Shin Bet (Israel's general security services) in 
dismantling the successive replacements of the youthful command structure, local 
leadership at the national level began to lose its depth and flexibility. Increasingly, the 
Unified Command's biweekly leaflets (manashir), which periodically established the 
uprising's protocols, were dictated directly from PLO headquarters in Tunis. Lost was the 
Unified Command's ability to initiate on-the-spot changes in national policy such as 
restraining the spread of violent action to Israel proper and emphasizing civil 
disobedience over armed struggle in an attempt to force Israel to parlay rather than 
succumb. By the end of the Intifada's first year, however, local initiatives had largely 
been absorbed into PLO thinking while Fath's diplomatic offensive on the international 
front offered the only hope that the army's increasing success at rooting out and 
controlling the level of local resistance would not doom the Intifada in its unequal match 
against Israeli military, economic, and administrative might. 
The popular committees in each town, village, and camp also eventually fell 
under the control of the Shabibah and the hundreds of former security prisoners (released 
in 1985 for six Israeli soldiers in a deal brokered by Ahmed Jebril's non-PLO splinter 
faction, PFLP-General Command). At the outset, the popular committees sought mainly 
to provide medical care and social services to Palestinians hurt in the uprising. In 
addition, the aid committees set about reorganizing local commerce, agricultural 
production, and education in order to locally sustain the Unified Command's calls to 
strike and boycott Israeli goods and to compensate for Israel's closing of Palestinian 
schools. 
From the start, the Shabibah's organizational know-how provided an in-
frastructure for the aid committees. But these local civilian-support groups also drew 
upon qualified professionals, students, workers, and housewives from virtually every 
walk of life who had evinced no history of active participation in any political 
organization. Although at first tolerated by the Israelis, their aid to the injured and their 
"do-it-yourself" tactics came to be regarded by th-, security services as abetting the 
enemy and fostering civil disobedience. Forced underground in August 1988, the popular 
committees soon transformed into local operational commands of the Unified Command, 
directed by the experienced cadres of Fath's Shabibah and former security prisoners of 
the other PLO groups (especially PFLP and DFLP). Still it was the shotgun wedding of 
spontaneous civilian support to the PLO's post-1982 organization in the Occupied 
Territories that has institutionalized local coordination of the uprising and maintained a 
national mobilization of the people. 
There is another significant factor in the formation of a Palestinian national 
ideology and institutional framework and in the transformation of the accompanying 
ideology of violence from "armed struggle" to "techniques of resistance," including 
"nonviolence." This factor is the example of the Israeli nation-state, which has spurred 
Palestinians in general and the PLO in particular to gradually adopt those forms of 
pluralistic democracy that could best assure the coordinated survival of its diverse 
constituents.38 In fact, there are striking similarities between the manner in which Fath 
established its hegemony over the PLO by inviting the participation of politically diverse 
resistance groups in the late 1960s and early 1970s and the manner in which Zionist 
Labor (Mapai) established its hegemony over the Jewish settlement (Yishuv) in 
mandatory Palestine. 9 Plausibly the Zionist example served as something of a model for 
the Palestinian organization, although their respective trajectories indicate an inverse, 
rather than a direct, relation: Once Labor established hegemony in the Zionist movement 
and opened the ranks of the Jewish Agency and its executive to include religious and 
nationalist groups, it changed its main priority from "building socialism" to building a 
state."° After statehood, advancement to positions of political responsibility were no 
longer predicated on social service but primarily on service in the state bureaucracy and 
the military. By contrast, a guerrilla background is no longer a sine qua non for 
advancement in the middle ranks of the PLO (the upper ranks being still reserved for the 
"founders") and "civilian" personalities are coming to occupy increasingly prominent 
positions in the Palestine national movement 41 
Like Zionist Labor, Fath's predominance within the national movement owes 
more to its main action on behalf of the concrete task of nation building from within than 
on behalf of a commitment to pannational alliances or ideologies. But Zionist Labor, in 
its conversion from a movement of social construction and mobilization to military and 
bureaucratic "statism," has left its waning legacy of state power to nationalist elements. In 
order to maintain a national consensus, these elements rely increasingly on a symbolic 
justification for the organization of force-whether that force be considered "defensive" 
(by most Israelis) or "coercive" (by most Palestinians)-rather than on a centralizing 
commitment to a common social program. By contrast, Fath's ability to forge a national 
consensus depends less than ever on its military role and more on success at merging its 
diplomatic, administrative, and social services with the PLO structure as a whole. This 
arguably provides a common outlet of political expression for diverse elements of the 
Palestinian community both within the territories and throughout the world. As a result, 
potential violence between disaffected elements within the community may be 
appreciably lessened while violence against the common enemy can be calculated and 
coordinated to achieve the widest reasonable gain (international pressure on Israel to 
force recognition) at lower cost to life than a shooting war.42 
It is especially within the ranks of "mainstream" Fath, that policy decisions reflect 
a conscientious attempt to avoid a repetition of the failings of the revolt and the ensuing 
"catastrophe" (Nakba) of 1948. Criticism of the means and goal of the Thawra thus 
constitutes a significant factor in the emergence of an increasingly pluralistic and 
consensual Palestinian ideology of struggle. Indeed, the Thawra operates as the Intifada's 
primary model and foil in this respect. As Palestinian political analyst Elias Sanbar notes: 
 
If the means of struggle form an historical continuity-the permanence of certain social rules, of 
certain techniques [of resistance], of a certain memory of past collective struggles-the Intifada cannot 
thereby be reduced to being a successful 'remake' of that other aborted revolution. The differences, the 
originality, are profound and not only with respect to the period, the means, the processes of resistance, but 
especially the vision and political targets that the present movement has fixed.43 
 
Under a different interpretation, reflection on the revolt also determines aspects of 
Israeli appreciation of the uprising. According to Hebrew University 
professor of family law Ze'ev Falk: 
 
The record of the PLO both against Israelis and Jews as well as against Arabs is well known. 
During the intifada as well as during the Arab Revolt of 1936-39 the Arabs killed and wounded more Jews 
than Arabs and created a terror regime similar to that of Lebanon ... people accused of collaboration, 
leaders who venture to express an independent view, laborers violating one of the continuous strikes and 
many other Palestinians are being attacked, wounded and killed by the henchmen of the PLO and Hamas.44 
 
The Intifada, like the Thawra before it, is thus proof-positive of the "medieval 
ethos" of Arab fanaticism and militarism, which would make a Lebanon of Israel should 
the Jewish state cede to Palestinians seeking "equity" through "unsuitable means" that 
"should not be in a liberal democracy. ,45 
Israeli profiles of the adolescent stonethrowers-the violent "front line" of the 
Intifada-stress the alienation of Palestinian youth from their own society. Arab culture, it 
is argued, places a strong emphasis on values such as courage and dignity for males. 
These subcultural values define certain circumstances and stimuli that appropriately 
evoke physical aggression, especially on the part of young Palestinian males who are 
generally unemployed and out of school. In this vein, following an impassioned appeal to 
Palestinians to "keep the children out of the war," Ze'ev Falk is pessimistic that his appeal 
will be heeded given the "medieval social ethos" of young Palestinian stonethrowers:46 
 
Unfortunately for Arab children and for Arab nations in general, the disregard of children's 
interests is a result of stagnation and lack of cultural development. The social ethos of Arab society is still 
in its medieval stage of militant Islam. Hence the fighter stands at the apex of the social pyramid, and the 
child chooses stonethrowing to achieve recognition. Instead of seeking success in various directions of 
cultural development, Arab society is still caught up in honor, pride, glory and similar values of medieval 
militarism.47 
 
Italian judge Domenico Gallo, however, offers a quite different appreciation of 
who is keeping the children hostage to war. 
 
Who actually makes a cynical use of Palestinian children? Don't you think closing the public 
schools, forbidding private lessons, even forbidding the UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency] ... to distribute to the children didactic material, is just like symbolically taking all the children as 
hostages to hit the Palestinian people in what is most sacred to them and to any other people: the love of 
their children. 48 
 
Palestinian analysts tend neither to stress inherent values nor hardship as the 
principle motivation for stonethrowing. While they acknowledge that Arab cultural 
values are indeed distinct from Israeli values, such values do not directly condone or 
require violence. Rather violent behavior is a product of the way social structural 
conditions-in particular politically determined conditions-limit the expression of these 
values.49 Violent forms of collective protest (of which stonethrowing is perhaps the most 
frequent and ritualized example) are considered to arise more out of a conscious 
engagement in the struggle for political expression,50 than because of frustrated 
socioeconomic expectations.51 
 
It is this tenacious denial of the Palestinians as a people that enables Israel to believe it can 
successfully impose a colonization and ultimately succeed in overseeing docile inhabitants content to hew 
the wood and till the soil remaining them, while buying television sets and washing machines. However, it 
is the Palestinians' insistence upon their identity as a people that, barring the mass population transfer to 
neighboring states called for by growing numbers of Israeli extremists, dooms Israel's efforts to ultimate 
failure.52 
 
From this vantage, stonethrowing is a controlled political act meant to "show the 
world and especially Israeli citizens that the [national] movement constitutes a menace 
for the Israeli occupation but not for Israel itself within the frontiers of 
1948-49."53 
But it is on the symbolic plane that the ritualized medium of stonethrowing most 
strongly evokes the Intifada's relations of continuity and change with the Thawra. The 
stones cast, mostly by young men born and bred under Israeli occupation, are interpreted 
in the chants and poems of the Intifada (azjal) as parts and voices of the dismembered 
motherland. As such, the stones are endowed with an almost mystical force to overpower 
the bullets launched by the iron fist. This force does not operate exclusively in the 
material realm but more significantly in a realm close enough to the material to have a 
physical impact and closer still to that of the communication media where the war will 
ultimately be won or lost. The militant core of stonethrowers is largely perceived, both by 
Palestinians and Israelis as rooted in the refugee camps. The camps, composed mainly of 
sundered families uprooted from areas lying within Israel's pre-1967 borders, have 
become the true "villages" of today's Palestine, and the interconnected organizations of 
young refugees now constitute the real "families" of the nation. 
Unlike the Thawra's peasant fellah, the Intifada's young shabab has little material 
connection to the soil yet has succeeded in conceptualizing an organic tie between land 
and nation that appreciably overrides the cleavages of religion, class, and clan that 
plagued the earlier revolt: "[D]o not ask me my party or religion, I am of the soil of this 
land and my name is ' arabi falastini" (an Intifada zajal). In the emerging lore, these 
young people of the Intifada are imagined by themselves and by their elders as the 
budding "flowers" and stoutly maturing 44 live trees" of the land. To the western media's 
criticism: "[H]ow can parents send their children out to face injury or die?", the response 
is one of honor and pride: "[W]e protect our motherland from further violation and from 
the dishonor inflicted on her children-our brothers and sisters-by their dispossession and 
disenfranchisement. We are the descendants of the disappeared fellahin-their avengers 
and redeemers." 
The question is whether the spiraling cycle of violence between the army, their 
collaborators and the stonethrowers will destroy the delicate balance between "politics," 
symbolism, and physical violence in favor of the latter. Israeli military leaders 
acknowledge that the Intifada represents the popular uprising of a whole nation that 
cannot be subdued with anything like the techniques of repression currently being used. 
Either the army would have to increase the level of violence by orders of magnitude, or a 
"political solution" will have to be found.54 Still, the fact is that the level of military 
violence shows little sign of ebbing in the third year of the Intifada. Although the 
number of Palestinians killed by the army fell by more than half in the first four months 
of 1990 from the nearly 100 killed in the first four months of the preceding year, the 
massacre of 7 Palestinian workers by a lone Israeli gunman, and the subsequent killing 
of an equal number of protesters by the army on the same day demonstrated to many in 
the Israeli military and the press that: "a single event suffices to provoke an explosion 
[because] the basic conditions that are at the origin of the Intifada have not only failed to 
have been eradicated but have worsened. "55 Indeed "for the first time since 1967 riots 
and strikes encompassed the entire Arab population living under Israeli control," 
including violent Arab Israeli demonstrations in Nazareth. 6 Fundamentalist extremists 
on both sides were quick to mobilize in the cause of violence as Israel and Arab 
countries talked of the increased likelihood of generalized war. Although violence again 
ebbed over the summer months, the killing in October by Israeli police and border 
guards of over a score of Palestinian demonstrators on Jerusalem's Temple Mount was 
the bloodiest single event of the Intifada to that date. Symbolically and politically, it was 
also the most portentous. 57 Rather than attempt to calm passions, the Israeli government 
simply and (according to Israeli journalist Ze'ev Schiff) quite falsely claimed that the 
violence had resulted from a premeditated Iraqi-PLO plot to undermine the U.S.-led 
anti-Iraq coalition. Moreover "to block further violence, the Israeli army kept 
Palestinians in the occupied territories confined to their homes" while advertising in 
Israel's major newspapers to exhort "Jews to gather at the Wailing Wall ... in a show of 
defiance against the Arab stoning attack that prompted the violence."58 In such an 
atmosphere, it is hardly surprising that few Israelis or Palestinians doubt that more 
violent times are ahead. 
With regard to future attitudes and actions of youth toward violence. according to 
a poll sponsored by the Israeli Ministry of Education, there is an alarming trend among 
the next generation of Israeli soldiers: 40 percent of current Jewish high school students 
"hate all, or almost all, Arabs."59 Among young Palestinians too, the forecast is 
ominously clouded. Increasingly, youth are involved in attacks on "collaborators." The 
first acknowledged killing of a collaborator occurred in February 1988, three months 
after the outbreak of the Intifada (after he shot to death a four-year-old). Imprisoned 
nationalist leaders even organized clandestine political indoctrination courses in their 
jails to preach against reprisals on informers. By summer 1989, however, "collaborators" 
were being killed with greater frequency and less discretion. Increasingly, common 
prostitutes, drug users as well as peddlers, and others who would betray the moral 
"purity" of the Intifada were being shot and stabbed to death, burned and buried alive, 
decapitated or otherwise eliminated. 60 
Israelis and Palestinians blame one another for the brutalization of their respective 
societies. But whereas the present Israeli administration seems prepared to maintain and 
even increase the level of violence as the struggle goes on, the dominant factions of the 
PLO-plausibly with the lessons of the Thawra in mind and in consideration of the 
Western media-have appeared to be making a concerted effort to reign in the use of 
"revolutionary justice" and even emphasize wholly nonviolent forms of civil 
disobedience, such as nonpayment of taxes.61 Nevertheless, without movement on the 
international political-diplomatic front, it is hard to see how renewed emphasis on 
nonviolent civil disobedience can effectively counter the foreboding chant of the 
disaffected youth of Gaza, Nablus, and Jenin: "Abu Ammar (Arafat's nom de guerre) 
patience has run, your people revolt, wanting a gun" (Abu Ammar, as-sabr rah, sha'abak 
tha'er, bidu slah).62 
 
THE MORAL IMPERATIVE 
 
Whatever the pragmatic, rational, and instrumental relation between (1) the 
material goal and (2) the institutional means, that relation is based on a fictional reality 
that is an inherent part of (3) the moral imperative, which irrationally grounds the whole 
structure of violence. 63 From the Jewish side, the relation of Israeli society to the 
Palestinians is stamped with "a deeply-rooted existential fear, which lives on a very 
particular interpretation of the Holocaust, such as the readiness to believe that the whole 
world is against us and we are the eternal victims."64 Accordingly, virtually any violence 
against them can be condoned in the name of Israeli "national security," which is 
considered the moral equivalent of the Jewish people's desperately unending struggle for 
survival against nearly impossible odds. As OC Northern Command Major-General 
Yossif Peled stresses, the army's role is to see Israel free by keeping the guard up against 
the Arab threat, that is, the threat of extermination: "[W]e have to be strong to deal with 
all eventualities, remembering what our people have gone through and the six million 
who died."65 For only Israel is the plausible victim of genocide. 
 
Palestinians living in the territories controlled by Israel now frequently allege that they are 
victims of "genocide".... Yet ... only Israel is a plausible victim of impending genocide. Although the 
Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza face an increasingly harsh "iron fist" response to the intifada, it is only 
the Jews of the region who face annihilation. 
 
Using the paradoxical logic of the Holocaust motif, Israel thus claims its right to 
be a virtual superpower in the Third World because of its victimization by the First 
World. Within this perspective, Israel's brutal "iron fist" against the Palestinians is 
trivialized while Palestinian violence is magnified to potentially monstrous, "impending" 
proportions. The fact that, since independence, Israeli Jews have killed far more 
Palestinian Arabs than Palestinian Arabs have Israeli Jews can thus be laid to a justified 
principle of disproportionate retaliation. 7 In this regard, increasingly large segments of 
the the Israeli army and public no longer shy from the rallying cry of ultranationalist poet 
and ideologue Uri Tsvi Greenberg who wrote during the Arab Revolt in 1937: 
 
Double blood for blood. Double fire for fire ... for thus races repay their enemies; across 
generations and throughout time .... A country is conquered in blood ... from thz River of 
Egypt to the Euphrates. 68 
 
As Moledet party leader Rehavam Ze'evi ranted on the floor of the Knesset: 
"Every Jew is worth a thousand Arabs" (kol yehudi shaveh elef aravim)69 From this slant, 
even extreme measures can seem a barely adequate response to the neo-Nazi menace. 70 
Charges of brutality are thus curtly dismissed as vestiges of European ignorance-if not 
covertly antisemitic relishing-of the Jewish plight: For example, Amnesty International 
reports of Israeli paramilitary death squads, summary executions, and "the wide range of 
human rights violations by Israeli forces since the outbreak of the intifada."71 For Israel in 
fighting Palestinians is up against Nazi surrogates and their apologists. 
The fundamentalist fusion of messianic aspirations of redemption and apocalyptic 
visions of failure, which proves generally congenial to Israel's dominant party in 
government, the Likud, thus allows a ready transference of th;, memory of the Nazi-
driven holocaust to current reality. Within this framework, Israel Eldad, the intellectual 
guru of the Israeli radical right, justifies the assassination of PLO leaders along the lines, 
say, that "Abu Jihad ... was none other than a Palestinian version of Eichmann." 2 In the 
same vein, Prime Minister Shamir (Likud) has compared Yasser Arafat's recent peace 
overtures to the "time in the 1930s when Hitler was celebrated the world over as some 
kind of savior....They belong to the same family of totalitarians, enemies of the Jewish 
people, men who think nothing of killing millions to achieve their objectives." For 
Defense Minister Moshe Arens (Likud), European contacts with Arafat are thus 
reminiscent of Western appeasement of the Nazis. 3 According to Housing Minister Ariel 
Sharon, any peace overture by the PLO is thus ruled out in advance.  
 
Suppose, for a moment, that after the extermination of millions of Jews, Adolf Hitler, old and tired 
from so much fighting, offers to the State of Israel to negotiate peace and war reparations. Is it imaginable 
that we would negotiate with him?74  
 
In this way are the six million "nationalized."75  
 
Nationalization of the Holocaust 
Although today, the memory of the Holocaust (or Shoah in Hebrew) furnishes 
perhaps the chief stock of centralizing symbols for Israeli identity and national 
consciousness, this was not always so. Except for the immediate aftermath of World War 
II, when Zionism needed the silent support of European Jewry's murdered masses to 
counter British and Arab opposition to statehood, the Holocaust was virtually ignored by 
Israeli writers and politicians throughout the 1950s. For the Labor party, the dominant 
force in Zionism since the 1930s and the principal architect of the state, the Holocaust 
symbolized almost everything in Jewish relationships with the world that Zionism aimed 
to replace. The Holocaust, argued Labor leader and Prime Minister David Ben Gurion, 
"represented past events in foreign countries, the sad memories of Jews in exile, but not 
the affective experiences and events of life that instruct and guide us."76 Indeed the 
overriding "imperative of the Jewish revolution" was "to break radically" with the 
Diaspora (Galut): "Galut means dependence-material, political, spiritual, cultural, and 
intellectual dependence-because we are aliens, a minority, bereft of a homeland, rootless 
and separated from the soil, from labor, and from basic industry."77 At this stage then, the 
moral of the Holocaust was that the better part of Jewish life and history should be 
forgotten. Unconvinced on this score, most Jews have continued the option of extending 
that history in the Diaspora. 
From Labor's vantage, the symbolism and memory of the Holocaust served 
primarily as Zionism's foil: the young, secular, laboring, and creative pioneers of the new 
Israel, with their "elite" army, would "master our fate," "take our destiny into our own 
hands," and "create, by our own effort, the necessary conditions for our future." When, in 
1954, the Labor Government established Yad Vashem ("the Place and the Name," Isaiah 
56:5) as an institution "to commemorate the Holocaust and Heroism," the governors of 
the young state meant the focus to center on "heroism," rather than on the millions 
sheepishly brought to slaughter. A national day for the commemoration of the Holocaust 
was chosen to coincide with the anniversary of the most defiant act of physical resistance 
to the Nazis: the Warsaw ghetto uprising. The slogan "never again" was taken to mean 
that this atypical example of the Diaspora's courage and prowess would henceforth 
become a commonplace part of the moral character of young Israel. Holocaust Day was 
thus symbolically interjected (though hardly remembered in public ceremony) in the two 
weeks of collective celebration and national contemplation between Passover and 
Independence Day-between the first and second Exodus to freedom. 
By the end of the 1950s, Israel's immigration and growth began to stagnate and 
rising Arab nationalism again threatened its security. The capture in 1960 by the Israeli 
secret services of Adolf Eichmann, principal coordinator of Hitler's "final solution," 
marked a new stage in the Israeli construction of national identity through the memory 
of the Holocaust. The first true "media event" in Israeli history, the Eichmann trial 
broke a tacit conspiracy of silence about the Holocaust's victims and the remnants of the 
Diaspora. It seemed geared to permit a haltingly maturing Israel to reestablish contact 
with the Jewish past and the world outside in order to derive renewed sustenance from 
both. Still, there was little attempt to go beyond describing the litany of Nazi atrocities 
and the helplessness of their victims. Few Israelis paid heed to Gershom Scholem's open 
leader in defense of Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem, which refused to coun-
tenance Zionist intimations that Hitler's victims tacitly "collaborated" in their own 
execution by the simple fact of their living in exile rather than choosing exodus. 78 
The exuberant Israeli victory of June 1967 again reduced the significance of the 
Holocaust's service to the state. But following the traumatic near-defeat of October 
1973, the Holocaust began to acquire a fresher and more acrid national and international 
character. From the mid-1970s on-with immigration, growth, and the socialist mission 
for national construction stagnating and Palestinian resentment over occupation rising-
Israel's post-Ben Gurion generation of governing Labor bureaucrats began the insidious 
process of dubbing any Palestinian guerrilla action "terrorism." This dubbing was 
intended to secure internal and external support for the state on three grounds. First, by 
manipulating the centralizing logic of the nation-state to marginalize Palestinians as 
potential "terrorists," political representation could be denied them; their land could be 
more readily alienated; their houses, destroyed; and their children, prevented from 
returning home. 9 The weakening Labor government could then legitimize colonization 
of the Occupied Territories before world opinion on the simple basis of "national 
security," although even Labor "doves," like Abba Ebban, acknowledged to their local 
audience that extension of the Jewish "homeland" beyond its pre-1967 "Auschwitz 
lines" was a more primary consideration.80 Second, by then embedding discourse on 
terrorism in the centralizing cold war rhetoric of the western alliance, Palestinian 
terrorists could be stigmatized as the agents of a monolithic "communism" intent on 
world hegemony-a view congenial to the United States' bipolar vision of the world at 
the time.81 Third, by assimilating communist-sponsored terrorism to attacks against the 
moral person of a state that claimed to represent the Holocaust's survivors, Palestinians 
could be thus transformed into would-be nazis before the eyes of the world.82 
With the ascent to power of Menahem Begin and the nationalist right, the inverted 
equation of Palestinian opposition with the terror of the Nazi state became total: "In the 
Land of Israel we are condemned to fight with all our soul. Believe me, the alternative is 
called 'Auschwitz'. We are determined to do everything to prevent another Auschwitz. 
"83 "From this perspective," notes Idith Zertal, "it is not a formidable army that 
penetrates Lebanon, in the midst of a civilian population, to confront a handful of 
Palestinian terrorists, but a handful of survivors that go out to avenge Auschwitz and 
build a new order where the vanquished become conquerors and weakness makes 
strength."84 Holocaust Day, too, is transformed from a mere passing note in the interval 
between the two great Zionist homecoming festivals. A somber national ceremony with a 
heavy military aura, its negative tones now drown out the fading clarion of Labor's 
hollow call to form a nation united in social purpose.85 The definitive response to Hitler's 
"final solution" to the Jewish problem becomes the "state Zionism" preached by the 
nationalist heirs of Vladimir (Ze'ev) Jabotinsky's prestate revisionist movement: 
"Revisionism sees the aim of Zionism as providing a complete and final solution of the 
Jewish world-problem in all its aspects....For the purpose just described, the territory of 
Western Palestine alone is not sufficient." 86 In the moral logic of the secular Israeli right 
then, greater Israel is the answer to Auschwitz. 
Given this moral framework, the outbreak of the Intifada and the rise of 
Palestinian violence has led to a disproportionate Israeli reaction. What were once 
considered extremist (or even "crackpot") proposals just before the Intifada have now 
become commonplace policies increasingly acceptable to the Israeli mainstream. For 
example, days before the outbreak of the Intifada, Gideon Altschuler, a founding member 
of Tehiya, advocated that Arab stonethrowers, including children, be dealt with by 
issuing shoot-to-kill orders.87 Not only have such orders been issued, but soldiers are now 
permitted to fire live ammunition at masked youths even if they are not armed, throwing 
stones, or engaging in any overtly hostile action.88 
Israelis not only fear their adversary but also create through their very selective 
`memory of the Holocaust' confusing images of "terrorists" and "terror." This ultimately 
leads Israelis to practice on Palestinians that which is fantasized and feared about 
Palestinians on Palestinians.89 Thus during unsettled situations, Israeli settlers may bash 
in the heads of Arab adolescents or set fire to Arab fields without fear of punishment 90 
On the contrary, the army simply absolves itself from responsibility with "warnings that 
Israeli soldiers may no longer be able to control Jewish civilians."91 Indeed when settlers 
rampage, it is the victims who are punished with curfews whose violators may be shot on 
sight: "An army spokesman said Israeli troops were not responsible.... He said the army 
clamped a curfew on the village of 3000 to aid its investigation. It was the worst incident 
in a recent outbreak of vigilante reprisal raids by Jewish settlers on Arab communities."92 
Given the government's "iron fist" policy of "force, power and blows," even "manifestly 
illegal orders" to beat unarmed suspects "whether resisting or not" that lead to a suspect's 
death are not judged to be really "illegal" after all; rather they come under "gray areas" 
for soldiers in the field that "result in part from the complexity of the situation."93 
Consider that when four soldiers of the Givati Brigade where charged in the torture and 
death of a Gaza refugee camp resident, the military court dismissed the manslaughter 
account on the grounds that, after seven hours of being kicked, punched, beaten with a 
broomstick, and so forth, it was impossible to determine "who struck the fatal blow." 
Nevertheless "there is no doubt that the man died of violent beatings by soldiers. This 
must shock any civilized or moral person who values life," the decision said. Arguably, 
persistence of the underlying Holocaust motif thus runs the risk of rendering "Humanistic 
Judaism" a mere rhetorical apology for unbridled acts of brutality. 
By generalizing the role of Nazi victimizer to those fighting its policies, Israel's 
"Holocaust credit" in the West is gradually lost. Trivialization of the role of victimizer 
also prompts a corresponding banalization of the role of victim. In this regard, 
Palestinians argue that they too are victims of Nazism-not only indirectly through the 
United Nations decision to compensate Jewish victims of World War II with part of 
Palestine but directly through Israel's use of "Nazi tactics" and `racist violence."95 Israelis 
see the comparison as grotesque and a further indication of Palestinian immorality. Only 
they fail to see that "the original sin of ideologically instrumentalizing the `memory of 
the Holocaust' was committed by the Jewish-Israeli collective. "96 Unfortunately rather 
than debunking the ideologized "memory of the Holocaust," often Palestinians have 
further distorted it in ways that immunize it from any critical analysis and deprive 
humanity of its unparalleled moral force. In this Palestinian use of the Holocaust motif to 
imagine the evil culture of their adversary, Israel finds its own worst fears confirmed. 
As these moral musical chairs are repositioned, each side's victimizer is 
immorally perceived as a Nazi and therefore the would-be victimizer righteously 
perceives himself as an avenging victim. The only way out of this macabre game it 
appears is to forget "the memory of the Holocaust" without forgetting the Holocaust 
itself.97 But however reasonable or desirable such a course would appear, in fact the 
flame of that abusing memory is being fanned to ever more portentious heights by the 
violent spiritual and physical clash between the Intifada and the Israeli radical right 98 
 
Messianic Nationalism and the Holocaust Motif 
On the Israeli radical right, the Holocaust motif is embedded in a messianic faith 
that the Jews are compelled to reconquer and thus sanctify the biblical land of Israel in 
the manner of Joshua and King David. From a Zionist standpoint, national redemption 
differs from other struggles for national liberation in that political liberation has to be 
preceded by a return to the homeland of Zion. Jews can only realize their historic mission 
to redeem the soul of their nation and thereby act as "a light unto nations" (la-goyim) 
through total spiritual communion with, and physical domination of, the whole biblical 
land of Israel. Although socialist Labor Zionism exhibited messianic overtones, its 
criteria for national redemption were essentially those of the universalist and rationalist 
movements of the European enlightenment and Jewish haskalah: reason, science, 
technical achievement, liberalism, and humanism. That the Arabs of Palestine did not 
subscribe to such "progressive" aims was only proof of their "backwardness," not their 
wickedness. For the radical Zionist right, however, Jews are driven down the road to 
national redemption by essentially romantic and metaphysical notions that abhor the 
metallic hollowness of modernism and the weak and decadent liberalism of the West.99 
While many on the radical Israeli right do not altogether reject the Israeli state's 
principles of democratic pluralism and the secular rule of law, most are willing to 
subordinate those principles to the quest for a "greater Israel" and to advocate the use of 
extralegal means to thwart any perceived attempt to compromise that quest; for 
"democratic Zionism" implies that democracy is in the service of Zionism and not the 
other way around.100 Needless to say, Palestinian Arabs who do not subscribe to Zionism, 
have no claim to democratic rights in Israel. 
The leading light of the Israeli radical right, whether secular or religious, is the 
wide coalition of forces known as Gush Emunim (Block of the Faithful). Like Hamas, the 
radical Islamic fundamentalist movement, Gush Emunim maintains that God did not 
mean Palestine to be divisible. Although the coalition began to form following Israel's 
"inspired" victory in the 1967 Six-Day War, it did not coalesce until Israel was 
"chastised" by the Yom Kippur War of 1973 for letting the guard down against Gentiles 
bent on preventing the final redemption of the Jewish people. It is arguably "the most 
effective social movement that has emerged in Israel since its 1948 establishment".101 
Just as the concrete achievements of the kibbutz movement in mandatory Palestine 
helped propel the Labor party to dominance within the Zionist movement, nowadays it is 
the pioneering settlements of Gush Emunim that appear to an increasingly large Israeli 
public as most incarnating Zionism's positive program of spiritual redemption through 
colonization of the soil.102 As such, it provides the concrete foundation of socioeconomic 
achievement for a whole spectrum of right-wing parties that the nationalist (Revisionist) 
party of mandatory days so notoriously lacked, including: Tehiya, Tsomet, Moledet, and 
the ultranationalist wings of Likud, Shas, and the National Religious Party. 
Regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, Gush policy proceeds from the premise that: 
"Arab hostility springs, as does all anti-Semitism, from the world's recalcitrance in the 
face of Israel's mission to save it."103 Its message to the Palestinians is unambiguous-
forsake all political rights over any part of Israel, or forsake the right to live in Israel. 
 
If the advice of the evil counselors-your PLO and our Peace Now-is carried out, and Israel 
withdraws from the West Bank, you know that in a few years your extremists will takeover and inflict 
another war on this country. An Israeli army which will have to conquer Nablus, Hebron and Jericho again 
and shed blood for them again-will it leave a single Arab in the West Bank? 104 
 
To be sure, the position of Gush Emunim and its many sympathetic supporters on 
the radical Right was not always so extreme. Shortly following the unexpected 
completeness of victory in June 1967, which enlarged territory under Zionist domination 
threefold, a very large cross-section of Labor's ruling elite, the leftist intelligentsia, and 
remnants of the nearly-forgotten nationalist right formed a movement (Ha-tenua le ma' 
an Eretz Yisrael) for the permanent retention and settlement of the conquered territories. 
The Land of Israel Movement (LIM) of August 1967 was the broadest coalition in Zionist 
history. Among its adherents were Jabotinsky's son, Eri, ultranationalist ideoloques Israel 
Eldad and Uri Tsvi Greenberg, future Nobel laureate S.Y. Agnon, and followers of 
Yitzhak Tabenkin (founder of Labor's most dynamic kibbutz movement, Hakibbutz 
Hamiuhad). It also enlisted the sympathy of many members of Ben Gurion's splinter 
Party, Rah, (including war-hero Moshe Dayan) which had split from the dominant Labor 
party, Mapai after Ben Gurion left power.105 Arabs were urged to participate with Jews in 
reclaiming the territories long neglected as backwaters under Egyptian and Jordanian 
rule. 
By the end of the decade, however, the movement's lack of an activist political 
program, coupled with the withdrawal of Begin and the "classical Right" from the Labor-
dominated national unity government formed during the 1967 crisis, prompted Eldad and 
others to begin the process of politicization and radicalization of the "Greater Israel" 
camp.106 By 1973, LIM's successor, "Labor for the Whole Land of Israel," was squarely 
allied with Begin's newly formed Likud. The 1973 Yom Kippur War, although a military 
victory for Israel, was a psychological disaster, and the Israeli public's faith in the Labor 
leadership was severely shaken. In 1974, the growing number LIM activists were 
comparing Labor Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's acceptance of ("self-hating Jew") 
Kissinger's limited -erritorial compromise with Egypt and Syria to Chamberlain's 
appeasement of Hitler at Munich in 1938.107 
In March 1974, Gush Emunim was established, in part to resist further territorial 
concessions. Although initially a wing of Labor's ally, the National Religious Party 
(NRP), Gush soon dissociated itself with all other movements including LIM. Its aim in 
doing so was to avoid "politics" and concentrate on settling the Occupied Territories. In 
this, its chief tactical inspiration was Moshe Levinger, a former kibbutz rabbi. Shortly 
after the Six-Day War, Rabbi Levinger had defied Dayan, the Army, the Arabs, and a 
hostile press by illegally squatting in the West Bank city of Hebron in Judea, site of the 
1929 Arab massacre of (mostly non-Zionist, religious) Jews. This set the pattern for the 
media confrontation between Labor's limited "settlement for security" policy and the 
maximalist settlement designs of Gush, supported by Likud's large parliamentary 
opposition and growing public constituency. Even with Labor still in power, Gush won 
the right to settle in the heart of Hebron and in Samaria's Nablus region. 
The euphoria of Begin's stunning election triumph in 1977, which ended half a 
century of Labor dominance in the Zionist movement, soon gave way to near-despair 
when, at Camp David in September 1978, Begin agreed to give the Sinai back to Egypt. 
Now it was Begin who was compared to Chamberlain.108 Gush began mobilizing support 
against additional territorial concessions, inciting a split in the ranks of Likud and the 
NRP and encouraging the formation of a new political party, Tehiya. Although Gush 
failed to prevent withdrawal from Sinai despite considerable effort, its actions 
traumatized and further radicalized the nationalist right. Begin was compelled to begin 
implementation of Gush's ambitious 1978 settlement program, which called for 100,000 
Jews in the Occupied Territories within a decade. With the 1982 War in Lebanon 
looming, Begin invited Tehiya into the government and placed its founder and Israel's 
most renowned nuclear physicist, Yuval Ne'eman, at the head of the Ministry of Science 
and the government's Settlement Committee. Had it not been for Labor's brief return to 
power in 1984-1986, the current figure of more than 80,000 settlers would surely have 
been surpassed and Gush's target reached. 
The radicalization of Gush's position on the Arab question-and with it the position 
of the entire radical right-owes to a variety of factors. Foremost, perhaps, is the rise of the 
PLO and the sense of Palestinian nationalism among the Arabs of both Israel and the 
Occupied Territories. Israeli-Arab Land Day in March 1976, when six Arabs were killed 
and many more of Arabs and Israeli policemen were injured, convinced many Israeli 
Jews that either all Palestinian Arabs were PLO at heart or that no accommodation with 
the Arabs was possible without the annihilation of the PLO. In addition, by the early 
1980s, the deteriorating Israeli economy was leading to increased racial friction between 
Arabs and (typically Sephardi) Jews inhabiting urban slums and stagnant development 
towns who refused to further lower their standard of living to compete with cheap 
Palestinian labor. To the disgruntled, Gush offered generous terms for housing and 
employment in the Occupied Territories with hundreds of millions of dollars in 
settlement funds. 109 But the aggressive Gush settlement policies in densely inhabited 
Arab areas caused Arabs to fear their imminent expulsion, and they responded 
aggressively in kind. 
With rising Arab incidents of throwing stones and Molotov cocktails and 
especially with the May 1980 shooting and death of six Jewish Yeshiva students in 
Hebron, Gush activists began organizing terrorist attacks against selected targets 
(including the crippling of the mayors of Nablus and Ramallah) and vigilante raids 
against Arab villages. Gradually they began drawing closer in sympathy and act to the 
extreme anti-Arab program of Rabbi Meir Kahane, which included eviction of Arabs 
from the land of Israel and destroying the Moslem religious "abomination" on 
Jerusalem's Temple Mount.110 In 1984, Israeli intelligence revealed the existence of a 
secret underground (machteret), apparently operating with the knowledge and at least 
tacit approval of Gush's "father of settlement," Moshe Levinger. The underground had 
planned to blow up five crowded Arab buses and earlier plotted to destroy the Moslem 
Dome of the Rock in order to scare the Arabs into leaving the country and to retake the 
area of Solomon's Temple for the coming Messiah. 111 At first the disbelieving 
leadership of the Yesha Council, the primary settler organization in the West Bank, 
denied Gush involvement and hinted at a leftist conspiracy to discredit the 
movement.112 Yet not only did the evidence prove incontrovertible but also the principal 
protagonists vaunted their involvement. An embarrassing debate ensued within Gush 
ranks over the use of "countertenor" that was initially hostile to the underground. Most 
Gush Rabbis argued the opinion of their recently deceased spiritual guide, Rav Yehuda 
Tsvi Kook, who seemed to hold that the Israeli government and army were divinely 
vested with exclusive responsibility for the defense of the land of Israel. With the 
advent of the Intifada, however, an increasingly vociferous section of the movement 
opted to challenge the army's prerogative and bring their confrontational anti-Arab 
position out into the open, advocating "double blood for blood" and deportation of the 
entire Arab population of historic Palestine.113 
Although most adherents to the Israeli radical right's advocacy of Greater Israel 
and Arab transfer are nonreligious, nearly 90 percent of Gush's activists are religious 
fundamentalists.114 Fundamentalism, unlike ultraorthodoxy, does not leave the turn of 
events to God alone or allow His flock to contemplate and execute His commandments 
in social or political isolation. Rather, God makes a pact with man, which promises 
redemption and salvation for humankind on the condition that His chosen executors 
actively see to it that His will is done. Fundamentalism, because it is commanded to 
implement divine truth, must be as politically committed as it is dogmatically intolerant 
and uncompromising in regard to any political opposition. 
Most Gush members and many of their sympathizers follow the creed of 
messianic nationalism, that is, the redemption of greater Israel (Giulat Eretz Yisrael ha-
Shlaimah).115 In this worldview, Jewish existence has one essential purpose: to carry out 
the terms of the covenant between God and Abraham. 116 God's House, that is, the 
whole of Palestine (and perhaps parts of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt as 
well), must be purified by His chosen servants so that humankind can be saved from 
evil.117 But first the land must be possessed: 
 
To your descendants I give this land from the River of Egypt to the great river, the Euphrates. 
(Genesis 15:18) 
 
You shall dispossess the inhabitants of the land and dwell therein, for I have given you the land to 
possess it. (Numbers 33:53f.) 
 
Behold, the Lord your God has set the land before you: go up and possess it. (Deuteronomy 1:21) 
 
Within fundamentalist ranks a debate rages as to whether "conquest of the land" 
(kibush haqarqa) takes precedence over the preservation of (Jewish) life (pikuach 
nefesh), that is, whether withdrawal from the Occupied Territories falls under the 
principle that a Jew should give up his life rather than allow the area to be ruled by 
gentiles (ye' horeg v' al ya'avor). Nevertheless, there is at least general agreement that 
Israel has an obligation to rule sovereign over the territories even if it means casualties, 
provided the military estimates that success is likely.118 According to Shlomo Goren, 
former Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi, war over any part of the land of Israel constitutes an 
"obligatory war" (milhemet mitzva). This is especially so for (the Occupied Territories of) 
Judea and Samaria-"the very heart of the Land": 
 
when we have sovereignty over Eretz Yisrael and have the military power we are forbidden to 
permit non-Jews who are idolaters to live in Eretz Yisrael. Obviously, in order to achieve this goal we will 
have to exert force against them .... One might argue that the prohibition against "giving them lodging in 
Eretz Yisrael" does not apply to the Arabs, who are not idolatrous and whose monotheistic belief is 
unquestionable. This claim has no substance .... Our struggle against the intifada is in the category of an 
obligatory war which... is a super milhemet mitzva calling for mesirut nefesh-the utmost devotion.119 
 
Those who would thwart realization of the divine pact between God, His land and 
His people-that is the neo-Edomite Christian powers and the neo-Amalekite Arab 
peoples-must be overcome and where possible destroyed: "Any framework or 
international organization whose resolutions imply the humiliation of the honor of Israel 
has no right to exist." 120 The Holocaust has proven that socialist Zionism as well as the 
"traditional" Jewish nationalist right were sinfully wrong to suppose that western 
civilization rested on Judaic foundations. The Jewish Bible had barely penetrated the 
surface. It was Mr. Hyde's Kultur of the Third Reich, not Dr. Jekyll's siecle de lumidres, 
that expressed Europe's essential underlying nature. This evil nature had nearly destroyed 
the Jewish people, but had also blessedly killed off the Diaspora idea of emancipation 
through assimilation with the peoples of Europe. In the wake, Israel had risen through its 
war of independence like the phoenix, with its Jews both physically and spiritually 
resurrected. To Jewish fundamentalist eyes, this clearly was the culmination of the long 
cyclic history of divinely ordained catastrophe and miraculous deliverance. The final 
process of material redemption had begun (that of Meshiah Ben Yosef, Messiah the son of 
Joseph) and spritual redemption would soon be at hand (that is, Meshiah Ben David 
Messiah the son of David): "We are reliving the days of Joseph, Moses, Joshua and 
David all at once." 121 
For secular ultranationalists, Zionism in fact constitutes the material process of 
redemption, and the Messiah of spiritual redemption is comprised of the whole Jewish 
people redeemed. They simply substitute a transcendental historicogeopolitical mission 
for the divine imperative. The religious communion between land and people is 
replaced by an organic synthesis of the settler with his homeland, and the question of 
humanity's salvation is left moot: "I don't believe that God said anything to Abraham. I 
see in the promised borders the geopolitical mission of the people of Israel for its 
generations... it doesn't bother me that they [the religious] believe their source is 
divine."122 Within the messianic ultranationalist spectrum, there may be disagreement 
over momentary or tactical accommodation with adversaries for the sake of eventually 
converting them if they are Jews or eliminating them if they are not. But world opinion 
generally is considered pernicious, and Western (particularly American) opinion is 
ultimately irrelevant, 123 insipid, 124 or baneful. Even the opinion of world Jewry is 
essentially of no consequence: 
 
The Tehiya-Tsomet negates the Diaspora.... Every exile is bound, in the fmal analysis, to decline 
and perish, either as a result of assimilation and conversion or following persecution and even a future 
unavoidable holocaust. 125 
 
At their most visceral, secular ultranationalists amplify Rabbi Meir Kahane's 
religious diatribe against the anti-Jewish, effete, and degenerate notions of liberal 
democracy in Labor Zionism and western parliamentary tradition.126 
In the final battle between good and evil-as Israel approaches its destiny to 
deliver up the whole house of God-the old siren-songs reappear in subtler and ever more 
beguiling discourse. In place of the Golden Calf, or European ideas of enlightenment 
and emancipation, have come American "liberalism" and "human rights." As for the 
Arab, at best he may be tolerated as an "alien resident" (ger toshav) of the Jewish 
people in Israel.127 At worse, he is the primeval Canaanite tribesman who, together with 
his children and womenfolk, were to be smitten for harassing the conquering 
Hebrews.128 
The only metaphysical and concrete alternative to ultimate Jewish victory is 
physical and spiritual annihilation of Jews and Judaism. The closer Israel comes to 
achieving its goal, the louder evil cries and the mightier it threatens. From this 
messianic and chauvinistic standpoint then, Israel's growing international isolation is 
perhaps the best indication that the forces of good are on the march.129 For, "[1]o, the 
people shall dwell alone, and shall not be reckoned among the nations" (Numbers 23:9): 
 
A Sceptre shall rise out of Israel, and shall smite the comer of Moab, and destroy all the children 
of Seth.... And Edom shall be a possession, Seir also shall be a possession.... Out of Jacob shall come he 
that shall have dominion, and shall destroy him that remaineth of the city .... Amalek was the first of 
nations; but his latter end shall be that he perish forever.... Alas, who shall live when God doeth this! 
(Numbers 24) 
 
For by fire and by his sword will the Lord plead with all flesh: and the slain of the Lord shall be 
many... and they shall declare my glory among the Gentiles. (Isaiah 66) 
 
Accordingly, there is likely to be only one reasonable and "humane" outcome to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that avoids annihilation of one or the other side. It is an 
outcome long contemplated by Zionist planners but never so urgently as by the Israeli 
radical right: 
 
If we want to avoid unremitting bloodshed, there is only one solution-the transfer of the Arab 
population of the Land of Israel to the Arab states....This solution is a humane 
solution compared to the "final solution" which the Arab world plans for us. 130  
 
CONCLUSION: TERROR AND THE CULTURAL IDENTITY OF THE 
NATION STATE 
 
Two things are necessary to a nation-state: a culture and a homeland. So at least 
has the modern nation-state often been conceived. For the community of nations 
generally and the Jews in particular, the "Jewish question" has been posed in both 
theoretical and practical terms to treat the conceptual "anomaly" of a people without a 
homeland. This anomaly has occupied world attention to an extent all out of proportion to 
more apparently rational economic, demographic, and strategic concerns. Even the 
unremitting religious tangle of reciprocal misunderstandings, which distorts the 
aspirations that the Christian and Moslem nations perceive in one another, does not 
account for the world's unusual political interest in an area the size of New Jersey with a 
population barely that of greater Philadelphia. 
The conception that produces the problem is ontological, and the ontology is 
basically taxonomic. The cultures of the world, one presumes, naturally and exhaustively 
divide into mutually exclusive territorial homelands in which reside the essences of those 
cultures "as if the teleology of all social entities was the state. °131 Cultures that do not so 
divide are therefore unnatural. The understandable confusions that arise between modern 
peoples then often translate into conflicts about where exactly the "natural" boundaries 
must lie. But confusion over the Jewish question represents the basic problem intrinsic to 
the essentialistic notion of the nation-state in a striking way. From the essentialist 
perspective, the Jews represent one people too many on the face of the earth. In the 
course of this century, three "final solutions"-imperative and categorical in conception-
have been offered and partially implemented: assimilation to the fraternal brotherhood of 
all nations, extermination, and the ingathering of exiles in Zion. 
After the failure of Germany's attempt to instantiate its vision of the nationstate 
and given the ever-present unlikelihood of a communist dissolution of the nation-state, 
the United Nations opted for the Zionist answer to the Jewish question.132 The answer 
was fundamentally that first proposed in 1896 by Theodor Herzl in Der Judenstaat (The 
Jewish State): 
 
The Jewish Question exists. Where it does not exist it is dragged in by immigrating Jews. We 
naturally move to places where we are not persecuted; and by our presence the persecution comes about. 
This is true and must remain true everywhere, even in highly civilized countries-for instance, France-as 
long as the Jewish Question does not find a political solution.... 
It is a national question which can only be solved by making it a world-question to be 
dealt with by the civilized nations.... Palestine is our unforgettable historic home. The very name 
would be a force of marvelous potency for summoning our people together. ... For Europe we would form 
a portion of the rampart against Asiahere; an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism. 133 
 
But only Europe and to some extent, the United States, had ever supported this 
last proposition as a reason of state.134 
Throughout its nearly one hundred years, a central premise of Zionism has been 
that Palestinians did not and could not constitute a culture in a truly "national" sense. For 
liberal Zionist leaders like Wiezmann, the Palestinians were simply part of an 
amorphous Arab mass located at the western frontier, whose "real" center lay elsewhere: 
 
The problem of our relations with the Palestinian Arabs is an economic problem, not a political 
one. From the political point of view the Arab centre of gravity is not Palestine, but the Hedjaz, really the 
triangle formed by Mecca, Damascus and Bagdad."135 
 
For Zionist Labor, Palestinians could have no national culture because they 
lacked (the ability to develop) sufficiently advanced forces of production. Accordingly, 
argued Ben Gurion, "we do not recognize their right to rule the country to the extent that 
it has not been built by them."136 
Only the revisionist, or nationalist, camp in Zionism acknowledged the validity 
of Palestinian as distinct from pan-Arab-aspirations to nationhood and the 
incompatibility of those aspirations with Zionism. According to revisionism's founder, 
Ze'ev Jabotinsky: 
 
Their cultural standard is low, and they do not possess our endurance and willpower, but... they 
cling to the land of Israel, at least with the same instinctive love and primitive fanaticism displayed by the 
Aztecs to their Mexico or the Sioux to their prairies. To think that the Arabs will voluntarily consent to the 
realization of Zionism in return for the cultural and economic benefits we can bestow on them is infantile 
and has its source in a feeling of contempt which "Arabophiles" have for the Arab people... 
If it was possible (and of this I am very doubtful) to convince the Arabs in Bagdad and Mecca that 
for them the land of Israel is no more than a small and unimportant frontier region, for the Arabs of the land 
of Israel it would not be so, but would remain their homeland, the center and basis of their national 
existence.... 
I am optimistically convinced ... that both peoples, like good neighbors can live in peace. But the 
only way leading to such an agreement is by "erecting an iron wall," meaning that in the land of Israel there 
must be a power that will not under any circumstances lead yield to Arab pressure. In other words, the only 
way to achieve an agreement with them in the future is by absolutely avoiding any attempts at agreement 
with them at present.137 
 
From this vantage, if history required an association of nations that was neces-
sarily exclusive at its founding, the Jews must be given a place and the Palestinians a 
choice: to assimilate to the other Arab nations or to accept cultural "autonomy" without 
the political rights that go with the territory. This choice initially did not appear as stark 
as that which the Jews seemed to be faced with (to be in Zion or not to be) but neither 
was it altogether of a different conceptual sort. 
In Hegelian fashion, secular messianists allied to the revisionist movement saw 
Zionism as the material and spiritual culmination of an historical idea. Fundamentalist 
Zionists, moreover, know that idea to be divinely true. It is the original idea of religious 
Zionism's prophet, Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook: 
 
To regard Eretz Israel as merely a tool for establishing our national unity-or even for sustaining 
our religion in the Diaspora by preserving its proper character and its faith, piety and observances-is a 
sterile notion, unworthy of the holiness of Eretz Israel.... 
The securing of the structure of the world ... demands the upbuilding of the Jewish nation. The 
building of the people and the revelation of its spirit are one and the same process; it is indispensable to the 
rebuilding of the shaken world, which is waiting for that supreme and unifying force to be found in the soul 
of the Holy Congregation of Israel. The soul of Israel is full of the spirit of God. 138 
 
Fundamentalists also now know that they are engaged in a holy war in defense of 
that truth. The nationalization of the memory of the Holocaust is a symbolic mobilization 
in the service of that war. It has transformed the backward peasant into a pagan arch-
terrorist, and it has made terrorism the only real "culture" Palestinians stonethrowing 
youths could conceivably possess. This imagined culture in which "terrorism" is 
synonymous with "nationalism" is as empty of legitimate political and social agendas for 
national construction as is the actual nationalist Zionist program for the achievement of 
Greater Israel. In practice, this means the less substance there is in the political agenda, 
the greater the violence to impose it. 
The lowering of violent expectations in the Palestinian national movement is 
perhaps the surest sign that their national consensus is not just a reproduction of the 
coercive forms of national organization that have alienated them. Nurtured by the belief 
that only political independence will undo the social and economic privation they have 
suffered in exile and under occupation, Palestinians have endeavored to alter and 
institutionalize the basis for state formation front reactive and coercive forms to 
consensual ones geared to social mobilization and construction. In addition, Palestinian 
views of who may be counted among the nations and where are now considerably more 
open textured. Consider in this light the recent comments of Fath's second-in-command 
and former head of Black September Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyyad): 
 
In 1948 the Jews had come to the conclusion that the time was ripe to establish their own 
independent state in Palestine based on a reading of the ability and readiness of the Jewish people in 
Palestine and abroad to support and sustain such a state, as well as the readiness of the great powers to 
recognize its legitimacy... .Now, after more than 40 years, we feel, that we are in a somewhat similar 
position... .A unitary, binational state cannot be built without the acquiescence of both communities; and if 
it is established by force against the will of one of the two, it cannot stand the test of time. The day may 
come when the Jews of Israel and the Arabs of Palestine, their mutual trust nurtured by a period of 
peaceful, prosperous, and cooperative coexistence, decide that their interests lie in some form of union. But 
unless and until that day comes, both peoples' interests would be served best if each went its separate 
way.139 
 
Yet the harder Palestinians strive to meet Eurocentric expectations of what it takes 
a nation to become a state, the more the centralizing logic of nationalist Zionism works to 
marginalize them and to convince the "free world" that such pariahs do not deserve 
perhaps the premier spot in the taxonomy of nation-states: 
 
It was on America's Independence Day 14 years ago, that IDF forces rescued the hostages of a 
Palestinian terrorist group at Entebbe. That operation marked a turning point in the Western world's war 
against terrorism. Now the U.S. Administration's suspension of talks with the PLO has again signaled its 
dedication to the continuation of this war against antidemocratic, antipeace forces in the world.l40 
 
To the extent this strategy proves successful, the victims could well end up 
internalizing and inverting the ideology of violence that victimized them. It would not be 
the first time. The task of peace then is to stop this alternation at a lull in the conflict 
where each camp can recognize and tolerate the other as an abiding stranger within. 
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